





 ✔ The type has been replaced in your figures; please proof the figures carefully for any errors.
 ✔ The last page contains pull quotes that might be used in the article, depending on design and spacing 
considerations. Are these pull quotes appropriate? If not, please provide several alternatives. Pull quotes 





2 C O M P U T E R P U B L I S H E D  B Y  T H E  I E E E  C O M P U T E R  S O C I E T Y 0 0 1 8 - 9 1 6 2 / 2 0 © 2 0 2 0 I E E E
SECTION TITLE
 Smart spaces1 such as smart homes, comprised of Internet of Things (IoT) devices, people, and physical content, are different from traditional computer systems. Their cyberphysical nature 
ties intimately with the users and the built environment. 
Errors and conflicts in such spaces could have harmful, 
dangerous, or undesired effects on the user, the space, or 
the devices making up its IoT. Little has been done to date 
to ensure that smart space program-
ming models or runtime systems 
are capable of handling such critical 
safety issues. In this column, I will 
shed some light on the important 
need of accelerated advancements in 
these technologies, given the highly 
anticipated proliferation of the IoT 
and especially the personal IoT. 
When deployed within users’ homes, 
the personal IoT will constitute the 
most popular and perhaps the largest 
category of future smart spaces.
SMART SPACES
 <AU: Kindly check that the section heading is appro-
priate here.>
 I want to start by visiting the remote garage door opener 
popular in North American homes. It represents an exam-
ple of a simple smart space (smart garage) that consists of a 
powerful actuator (the 0.25–0.5-hp motor drive), a remote 
portable open/close switch, a light, a timer to turn off the 
light, and two infrared motion detection sensors installed 
a few inches off the ground at both ends of the garage door. 
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and the Elephant: 
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in Smart Spaces
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 Smart spaces deliver digital services to optimize 
space use and enhance user experience. The 
impact of ill-programmed applications in such 
spaces goes beyond loss of data or a computer 
crash; there is the potential risk of physical harm to 
the space and its users. Ensuring safety in this type 
of cyberphysical system is critically important.
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This simple smart space is successfully 
used by tens of millions of people ev-
ery day, thanks to its reliability and 
safety features. It can be operated from 
a distance, automatically turns the ga-
rage light on, and, most importantly, 
reliably detects the smallest objects 
or people, like small children, who 
may be in the door's path while clos-
ing. during door closure, which gets 
aborted through a reversing mecha-
nism. <AU: Please check whether 
the preceding edited sentence con-
veys the intended meaning.> These 
safety features were possible under a 
fixed, nonprogrammable design of all 
of the involved devices and sensors 
making up the garage door opener. 
Nothing could interfere or alter the 
operational logic of the garage door 
opener system, which guarantees its 
safety. But there is much more than a 
garage door opener in a smart space, 
and without the ability to program, 
reprogram, or download new applica-
tions, the space would be of very lim-
ited smartness and utility. For this rea-
son, several efforts began almost two 
decades ago to find successful models 
for “programming pervasive spaces.”2
 One model that has been very suc-
cessful is the service-oriented device 
architectures (SODA) model,3 which 
enabled the programming of smart 
spaces as service composition over 
software services representing all el-
ements of the space. This ranged from 
full-fledged computers to mobile de-
vices, actuators, or even pinhead-sized 
small sensors. Replacing the rigid and 
expensive ad hoc system integration 
approach to creating smart spaces by 
SODA’s f lexible, (re)programmable 
approach was disruptive in two key as-
pects. First, it created a much-needed 
separation between a pervasive sys-
tem and its pervasive applications. 
Second, by creating an external repre-
sentation of every element in the space 
in the form of an active service on the 
space edge computer or the cloud, it 
was possible to engage software de-
velopers in creating such applications 
instead of relying on system integra-
tors and engineers. Several implemen-
tations of SODA are in place today, in-
cluding the Atlas sensor platform and 
middleware.4
 Soon after celebrating the success-
ful SODA milestone, it became evident 
we just created an unrestrained pro-
gramming model that lacks adequate 
safety guards. That is, we realized that 
SODA was too powerful to be safe. We 
also realized that while its conceptual 
framework is elegant, SODA did over-
promise a little.
 THE MONKEY
 First comes the monkey. By abstract-
ing devices, sensors, and actuators 
into services, not only do we manage 
to engage software developers, but 
we overpower them to do just about 
anything with these services through 
unrestrained service composition as 
they develop applications in the space. 
This could be dangerous. Imagine 
a composed service of an automatic 
door opener with a strike-push mech-
anism getting invoked 50,000 times/s 
due to an infinite loop bug in the pro-
gram. This will most likely damage 
the opener mechanism by causing it 
to be jammed or burning out. It may 
even result in a fire hazard. It may, as 
an end result, lead to the door staying 
open, which is unsafe and unsecure. 
Another example is a high-volume 
speaker going off in the middle of the 
night, also due to a programming bug. 
This could be devastating to a sleep-
ing, frail elderly person with a weak 
heart. But even if the programming of 
an application is supposedly error  and 
goof free, correctly programmed appli-
cations may interfere with each other 
or conflict in their goals, which is an-
other ill-effect of the unrestrained 
service composition.  By replacing 
carefully integrated elements with 
programmable services, we allow 
for all possibilities, including those 
that do not make sense or could lead 
to dangerous or harmful situations.
<AU: Please check whether replac-
ing “by” with “with” in the preced-
ing sentence conveys the intended 
meaning.> We also open the door for 
programming errors and bugs to jeop-
ardize the safety of the user, the space, 
or its devices. Surely, we need the ele-
gance, flexibility, and power of SODA 
but we also need to safeguard against 
monkeying around, causing unpre-
dictable or undesired consequences in 
smart spaces.
 THE ANT AND THE 
ELEPHANT
 Second comes the ant and the ele-
phant. Presenting elements consid-
ered “fragile and weak” in a smart 
space as standard services tempts in-
discriminate use beyond the service’s 
capacity for duty.  Fatiguing fragile 
services could very likely lead to major 
reliability, availability, and depend-
ability problems. Dealing with and 
equating a pinhead device with a Dell 
server is obviously problematic, given 
the contrast in the mean-time-to-fail-
ure and the operational availability 
of each. This means applications may 
misbehave or themselves become un-
available. Once again, we wish to keep 
the advantages of SODA, but at the 
same time we should remove the mask 
and ensure that SODA is somehow 
aware and supportive to the varying 
power of its elements.
TOWARDS SAFER 
SMART SPACES
Safety research and development in 
smart spaces has been scant, perhaps 
because of market hesitation and the 
sluggish pace by which smart space 
technology has been entering the mar-
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safety been considered and built in 
from the start, perhaps market con-
fidence would have been gained and 
adoption would have been accelerated 
for smart space products and services. 
At any rate, it is time now to avoid be-
coming a “Giraffe” and burying our 
heads in the sand without an adequate 
approach to this important problem. 
<AU: Should “giraffe” be changed 
to “ostrich”?> In the remainder of 
this column I will highlight key prog-
ress made in this area, which I stress 
is inadequate, with more concen-
trated efforts needed by the research 
community.
To cope with the ant and the ele-
phant dilemma under SODA, compen-
sating “sentience abstractions” defined 
over other services has been sug-
gested. <AU: Please check whether 
the preceding edited sentence con-
veys the intended meaning.> The 
use of virtual sensors5 is an example 
in which multiple replicas of the frag-
ile elements in the space are employed, 
leading to redundant services grouped 
through quorum-based events to mask 
failures and extend the reliability and 
availability of these elements. An-
other sentience abstraction that has 
been introduced for the same reason 
is phenomena clouds,6 which are more 
appropriate than virtual sensors for 
sensor grids where detecting user-sen-
sor collision is of interest (such as an 
instrumented smart floor or smart 
bed). As shown in Figure 1, a phenom-
ena condition is defined, along with 
transition rules, that clearly labels 
sensor nodes as idle, potential can-
didate, candidate, or tracking. <AU: 
Kindly check whether the citation 
of Figure 1 is appropriate.> Satisfy-
ing the phenomena condition makes a 
sensor node tracking. The phenomena 
may grow or shrink as it develops and 
a threshold phenomena diameter may 
be required before it is determined to 
have happened. <AU: Please confirm 
changes to avoid repetition of “phe-
nomena” in this sentence.> Phenom-
ena clouds have been used success-
fully in the Gator Tech Smart House7 
to sense user walking behavior much 
more reliably than by directly read-
ing unreliable smart floor pressure 
sensors.
Empowering the ant through sen-
tience abstractions as shown above 
seems to be a reasonable approach to 
back SODA’s uniform service promise 
that all services are created equal. 
However, this would require build-
ing runtime systems for smart spaces 
that are able to support such abstrac-
tions simultaneously. For instance, 
raw data, events, contexts, phenomena 
clouds, activities, and behavior must 
all be supported so the programmers 
may pick the suitable one(s) in their 
applications.
To cope with the monkey, several 
approaches have been proposed, but 
much remains to be done. Chen et 
al8 argued that by ensuring safety 
piecemeal, that is, separately ensur-
ing safety of the physical space, the 
users, and the devices (the IoT), the 
overall safety of the space will be 
hugely improved. In this view, IoT de-
vice description language (DDL) was 
proposed9 to enable device vendors to 
express, in human- and machine-read-
able form, use constraints of their 
smart space product. Such constraints 
could be anything ranging from gen-
eral constraints that guard against 
device energy drains to device-specific 
constraints such as the strike-push 
door opener mechanism we discussed 
earlier. For instance, in the latter case, 
a use constraint could be that the 
mean time between two successive 
uses must be at least 2 s, which would 
perfectly guard against the 50,000/s 
invocation bug example mentioned 
earlier. Similar to the sentience ab-
straction idea, the DDL idea also has 
runtime implication. It requires that 
such constraints be runtime-regis-
tered exception handlers, which gives 
us clear cues to what a smart space 
runtime system should include. The 
DDL idea and the use of IoT constraints 
is not new, even though its application 
to digital smart space is. It is similar 
to how electric bumper cars in amuse-
ment parks function, where young rid-
ers are given the illusion they can turn 
the wheels infinitely and go flat out on 
the peddle; in reality, the constraints 
kick in at runtime, limiting the steer-
ing as well as the maximum speed.
Another approach to restraining 
SODA is to require so-called “safety 
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containers” to be used by the program-
mers as they develop their applica-
tions, much like database transactions 
are required to ensure the proper han-
dling of a database. IoT transactions 
(IoTransx) <AU: Please check that 
“IoTransx” is spelled out correctly> 
is a radical idea that has been proposed 
by Chen et al8 where the smart space 
is modeled as a highly dynamic data-
base. Unlike traditional databases and 
database management systems that 
take a “clean room approach” and cher-
ish atomicity, consistency, isolation, 
and durability (collectively known as 
ACID), smart space databases take a 
“dirty room approach,” where imper-
fection and the unattainability of full 
control and guarantees are the new 
normal and the sought goals. IoTransx 
aims to detect conflicting or inter-
fering SODA services belonging to 
applications developed separately by 
independent developers. Similar prop-
erties to ACID are utilized by IoTransx 
except that consistency is replaced by 
the concept of integrity. Integrity is 
achieved through a context lock proto-
col and the compensating transaction 
to be used if the context lock started 
to significantly slip. The kind of locks 
used by IoTransx are ones that tolerate 
minor violations of the locking seman-
tics in much the same way we would 
consider a slightly dripping water tap 
to be turned off. By developing all ap-
plications using such transactional 
programming constructs, the smart 
space runtime, again, would play a key 
role in ensuring the safety of the space 
despite conflicting applications.
Gadget app stores have started to appear, creating a similar ecosystem to the Apple apps 
store and Google Play. Smart spaces, 
therefore, have started to become a 
tangible market with pioneer prod-
ucts and services available to the 
consumer. Examples include most 
automobile brands, which today offer 
owners cloud accounts for purchased 
new vehicles to download after-sale 
services and apps. Samsung’s line of 
smart home products is also being 
marketed through an app store named 
SmartThings,10 which offers IoT de-
vices for the home in addition to ap-
plications that are ready to download 
(called Scenes), providing more excit-
ing applications out of the same set of 
gadgets purchased by the consumer.
To take smart homes to the next 
level of utility and usefulness, well be-
yond the simple applications of turn-
ing lights on and off as a motion sensor 
detects entrance to the living room, 
more research is needed to fully under-
stand how to create safe applications 
with substantial actuations in smart 
spaces. Smart homes for active and 
healthy aging or supportive of frailty, 
dementia, and other conditions, just 
to give a few examples, require the 
utmost level of caution and safety as 
we develop their applications. To en-
courage more research in the areas of 
fault tolerance, robustness, and safety, 
funding agencies also need to bring 
these issues back into focus and high-
light them in their programs. Such em-
phases were in place 15–20 years ago, 
but perhaps data science and artificial 
intelligence has overshadowed their 
importance. 
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Several efforts began almost two decades ago  
to find successful models for “programming 
pervasive spaces.”
We realized that SODA was too powerful  
to be safe.
By replacing carefully integrated elements with 
programmable services, we allow  
for all possibilities.
Safety research and development in smart  
spaces has been scant.
Soon after celebrating the successful SODA 
milestone, it became evident we just created 
an unrestrained programming model that lacks 
adequate safety guards.
Even if the programming of an application 
is supposedly error and goof free, correctly 
programmed applications may interfere with each 
other or conflict in their goals.
Fatiguing fragile services could very likely lead 
to major reliability, availability, and dependability 
problems.
More research is needed to fully understand how to 
create safe applications with substantial actuations 
in smart spaces.
